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By Greg Goebel
Part 2
By early October 1942, both the Japanese and the Americans
realized that they were committed to an intense life and death struggle
for Guadalcanal. The fighting then began in earnest between two determined
opponents.
11 October 1942 - The battle of Cape Esperance
Back in Rabaul, General Hyakutake had decided to commit
major resources to clearing the Marines off Guadalcanal. Unfortunately
for him, the old Army-Navy rivalries resurfaced again, and the Navy
refused to provide him with the means to transport his force in a consolidated
fashion down the Slot. The Navy felt the only way to run the gauntlet
was to send in small groups on fast destroyers at night. Even this was
becoming riskier, as American fliers were developing skills in night
attacks.
To break the impasse, Hyakutake sent his operations chief, Lieutenant
Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, to Truk to plead the Army's case with Admiral
Yamamoto. Tsuji made his case eloquently while Yamamoto listened patiently.
In the end, Admiral Yamamoto admitted that the Navy had made mistakes
that had cost the Army dearly, and committed to providing full naval
support for a big push to retake Guadalcanal.
Yamamoto also saw the operation as an opportunity. Once more, he would
have the chance to press the "decisive battle" on the US Navy.
Not all the Japanese military command was so optimistic. Guadalcanal
was at the end of a long and dangerously exposed supply line that was
vulnerable to increasing Allied air and sea power. In fact, some senior
officers were convinced the battle was a lost cause and had to be given
up.
General Kawaguchi returned to Rabaul to report on the situation. There
were those who disliked him and wanted him sent away for his failure,
but he had his patrons as well, and his eloquent description of the
suffering and failure of the Japanese Army on Guadalcanal helped convince
his superiors of the gravity of the situation. Because of his knowledge
of circumstances in the battle area, he was ordered to return to Guadalcanal
with General Hyakutake.
Vandegrift was feeling so optimistic that he launched a counteroffensive
against the Japanese on Guadalcanal, mostly concentrated to the west
of Henderson Field. On 23 September, he sent two battalions on a sweep
south towards Mount Austen that then curved west and north again. The
Marines met little resistance, and on 26 September finally joined up
on the Mataniko River with a third battalion that had advanced west
along the coast.
The combined force then tried to move west across the river on the 27th,
but found themselves quickly pinned down. Communications to the operational
commander, Colonel Edson, were garbled and he misunderstood them to
mean that his Marines were successfully pushing back the enemy. Edson
ordered an amphibious landing at Point Cruz, to the west of the mouth
of the Mataniko River.
The landing force managed to get ashore without trouble but immediately
ran into a trap. They lost 60 men, but managed to cut their way out
and were evacuated by a destroyer.
The strong reaction of the Japanese reinforced Vandegrift's belief that
he was facing a major enemy force that was preparing to attack him again.
In fact, there were only about 5,000 Japanese, and they were so weakened
by disease and starvation that only about half were fit for combat.
The Navy felt that Vandegrift was being excessively cautious, and Turner
wrote Vandegrift, suggesting that the general "go after them hard."
Vandegrift reacted angrily. There was a sullen stand-off for a few days,
until Admiral Nimitz flew in to Guadalcanal to inspect the situation.
He was noncommital but sympathetic, and Vandegrift felt encouraged enough
to launch a second counteroffensive.
This time he sent a full regiment up the coast, with orders to act as
loud and busy as possible. In the meantime, three battalions of Marines
crossed the Mataniko River upstream and curved around to the rear of
where the Japanese would be expected to make a stand on the west side
of the mouth of the river.
The regiment got to the east side of the river and began to make exaggerated
motions for a crossing. On the morning of 9 October, the Marines sprung
the trap, pinning in the Japanese, pounding them with mortars and artillery,
and cutting them down when they tried to escape.
It was a massacre. The Marines counted about 700 Japanese bodies, while
65 Marines were killed in return.
That evening, farther to the west along the coast at Tassafaronga Point,
General Hyakutake and his staff, along with General Kawaguchi, were
dropped off with supplies. Hyakutake saw for himself the desperate condition
of the soldiers, and his unpleasant awakening to the facts was accelerated
by the reports coming back of the slaughter along the Mataniko River.
He radioed Rabaul: SITUATION ON GUADALCANAL IS FAR MORE SERIOUS THAN
ESTIMATED.
Hyakutake had planned to simply attack Henderson Field up the coast,
but whatever illusions he might have had that simple bold action would
roll the Marines back in front of them had been thoroughly dampened.
Instead, he decided to send a regiment up the coast as a diversion,
while the 2nd Division under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama circled
south of Mount Austen and hit the Americans from the rear at night.
A trail had already been cut through the jungle to allow the movement
of Maruyama's men. The jungle was very rugged and the Japanese engineers
had only hand tools, but they had managed to clear a path, even though
soldiers could only infrequently walk upright along it.
General Kawaguchi had come to ruin fighting over the same and similar
terrain, and he was not optimistic. However, he knew his political position
was tenuous and he dared not protest loudly.
Hyakutake called for reinforcements, and on the 11 October six destroyers
and two seaplane carriers came steaming fast down the Slot, carrying
heavy weapons, supplies, and more troops.
The convoy was spotted by a B-17, and as the Sun set, a US Navy force
under Rear Admiral Norman Scott that had been hiding about 160 kilometers
(100 miles) south of Guadalcanal moved to intercept it. Scott was an
experienced Navy hand who had served in the First World War, and he
commanded a force of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and five
destroyers. The Navy had become tired of being beaten by the Japanese
at night, and Scott had been drilling his men for night combat for weeks.
What Scott didn't know was that the supply convoy was being accompanied
by a bombardment force, consisting of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers
under command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto.
Scott's scout planes targeted the supply convoy at about 2300 hours,
but the report was confusing, and Scott believed that he had only spotted
part of the enemy force. Despite the confusion of the US Navy forces,
the Americans spotted the Japanese first, and just before midnight the
light cruiser HELENA opened up on the cruiser AOBA, mortally wounding
Admiral Goto.
Scott ordered a cease fire under the mistaken impression that they were
shooting at friends. The Japanese were similarly confused, but in a
few minutes Scott decided the vessels in front of him really were enemies,
and bore in to attack.
In fact, Scott's warships had only slackened their fire. The confusion
over, both sides slammed into each other in earnest in the dark until
about 20 minutes after midnight. The Japanese cruiser AOBA took about
40 hits but survived, while the cruiser FURUTAKA and the destroyer FUBUKI
went down in Ironbottom Sound. The US cruiser BOISE was badly hurt but
survived, while the destroyer DUNCAN sank.
The Battle of Cape Esperance was a turning point for the US Navy. The
Americans had finally beaten the Japanese at their own game, a night
naval engagement, and the Japanese were correspondingly humiliated.
However, as with Mikawa's victory at Savo Island, Scott did not intercept
the supply convoy. They were able to deliver badly needed equipment
and supplies to General Hyakutake and his men.
This did not necessarily tip the odds in their favor. The Americans
were busily reinforcing Guadalcanal as well. On 13 October, Vandegrift
received a shipment of 2,852 Army troops from the Americal Division,
as well as more weapons, ammunition, and supplies. This gave Vandegrift
a total of over 23,000 men to defend Henderson Field.
Japanese pressure / Halsey takes command
Even as the Americans were sorting out the new arrivals that day, the
Japanese bombed Henderson Field with 24 aircraft at noon, inflicting
solid damage, followed some time later by 15 more bombers. Navy construction
battalions, or "SeaBees", were busy cleaning up the mess that
afternoon when they came under fire from a long-range 150 millimeter
gun that had recently arrived and been placed near the Mataniko River.
The Japanese gunners were skilled and accurate, and the Marines quickly
called the gun "Pistol Pete".
The Japanese were only getting warmed up, however. While the Sun set,
the battleships KONGO and HARUNA were moving towards Guadalcanal under
the escort of six destroyers, with orders to blast Henderson Field off
the map.
Japanese soldiers set up oil drums on the shore and set them on fire
to act as target markers. At a little after 0100 hours on 14 October,
the two battleships opened up with their 36 centimeter (14 inch) guns.
The bombardment was unlike anything the Americans had ever endured,
or that many of them would ever endure again. For a half hour, the big
shells pounded Henderson Field, smashing equipment and aircraft, blasting
fuel and ammunition dumps.
The shelling went quiet for a moment. It did not last for long, as the
two battleships were simply turning about to move back along the coast.
The hammering continued for another hour and a half. The Americans were
unable to put up any effective resistance, though four torpedo boats
made a valiant but futile attempt to attack the battleships. Finally,
after firing over 900 shells, the Japanese turned north and left.
From that time on, the incident would be known to those who endured
it as "The Bombardment". By midmorning, fires were still burning
all over Henderson Field. 41 Americans were dead, most of the aircraft
were damaged or destroyed, and almost all the fuel had been burned.
A Navy admiral in Espritu Santo, Aubrey Fitch, recognized the crisis
and ordered all available Dauntlesses and Wildcats under his command
to fly in and reinforce Henderson Field. He also organized an airlift
of fuel and other supplies, flying them in using Douglas R4Ds (the Navy
designation for the popular C-47 Gooney Bird).
In the meantime, six new Japanese fast transports were moving down the
Slot with 4,000 men, 14 tanks, 12 150 millimeter guns, and other supplies
under escort of warships and aircraft. The Cactus Air Force managed
to attack them with 11 aircraft, but with little result.
By midnight, the transports were being unloaded near Tassafaronga Point,
while the cruisers CHOKAI and KINUGASA provided a repeat performance
of the shelling of the previous night on a smaller scale. They fired
over 750 20 centimeter (8 inch) shells and then departed, unmolested.
The Cactus Air Force managed to catch three of the transports still
being unloaded when the Sun came up and set them on fire, forcing their
captains to ground them. However, most of the supplies and men had made
it to shore. General Hyakutake had 15,000 men and was ready to take
the offensive.
Vandegrift had an accurate picture of Hyakutake's capabilities and was
once more unsure that he could hold Henderson Field. He sent back a
report to his superiors that if Guadalcanal were to be held, the Navy
would have to put a stop to Japanese naval operations, and he would
have to be immediately reinforced.
Vandegrift's impression that Nimitz was on his side was confirmed when
Nimitz finally relieved Admiral Ghormley on 18 October, replacing him
with Vice Admiral William Frederick "Bull" Halsey.
Nimitz had not been pleased with Ghormley's lack of aggressiveness and
wanted someone who could fight. Halsey was a scrappy guy from New Jersey
who was much more inspiring than the relatively low-key Ghormley, well-liked
by his men and the press for his slugging aggressiveness and a certain
sort of crusty old-salt sense of humor.
Halsey received the order immediately after arriving at Noumea by flying
boat. "Jesus Christ and General Jackson!" he said. "This
is the hottest potato they've ever handed me!" He was not entirely
happy to relieve Ghormley, a friend for 40 years, and to be put in charge
of an operation that was hanging by threads.
He ordered Vandegrift to fly to Noumea to report on his situation. When
the general arrived, he detailed the desperate position of his men and
said he would need reinforcements. Turner raised objections that Halsey
knew were valid, but whatever the risks, the Americans could not afford
to lose Guadalcanal. It would be a major strategic and moral defeat.
Halsey told Vandegrift: "All right, go on back. I'll promise you
everything I've got." Halsey was determined to fight it out. He
sent out his first general order to his command:
KILL JAPS. KILL JAPS. KILL MORE JAPS.
23 to 26 October 1942 - Murayama's attack / Battle of Santa Cruz
On the ground, the Japanese were preparing for their big push to take
Henderson Field. Maruyama was hoping to have 5,600 men in place by 21
October to attack the Americans from the south, but even with the trail
cut through the jungle, the going was very tough for the sick and starved
Japanese, and that attack was repeatedly postponed.
General Kawaguchi was placed in command of the right flank of the attack.
The attack plan seemed much too similar to the one that had led him
to ruin in September, and he expressed misgivings about the battle plan
to Colonel Tsuji. Kawaguchi suggested that it would be better to try
to flank the American defenses from the southeast.
Colonel Tsuji agreed with Kawaguchi's changed plan and said he would
inform General Murayama. In reality, Tsuji had no use for the "liberal"
Kawaguchi, and regarded him as a loser. Tsuji never said a word to General
Murayama, and when Murayama found that Kawaguchi wasn't where he was
supposed to be, sacked him on the spot.
Finally, Maruyama set the jump off time for the night of the 24th. Unfortunately,
General Sumiyoshi on the coast didn't get the word and launched a diversionary
attack over the mouth of the Mataniko on the afternoon of the 23rd.
While the attack was supported by nine tanks, the Americans were well
prepared and only one of the tanks made it across the river, and it
did not survive long after that.
About 600 Japanese were killed. The diversionary attack was a costly
fiasco that did nothing but put Vandegrift's men on the highest alert.
By the next afternoon, they were perfectly aware that the Japanese were
massing to the south for an attack. Marine lines to the south were built
up under the direction of Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller, an
experienced Marine officer with a barrel chest.
The attack jumped off after midnight, and advance units excitedly announced
that they had broken through and were overrunning the airfield. Murayama
and his staff were enthusiastic, but the fighting became so intense
that it was clear something was wrong.
It turned out that the advance units had simply run into an open field
and in the dark had assumed it was the airfield. In fact, the attack
was being cut to pieces. By dawn, it was obvious that it had been a
bloody failure.
The mistaken report that the airfield had been seized was relayed
back to Admiral Yamamoto, who ordered a strike force under Vice Admiral
Kondo to move in and engage the US Navy around Guadalcanal. A separate,
smaller force, consisting of the light cruiser YURA and eight destroyers,
was already moving in to support Murayama's attack with naval artillery.
After the Sun came up, Yamamoto received word that the attack had failed,
and so the admiral told Kondo to halt and wait for further instructions.
The YURA force didn't get the word until it was too late. Dive bombers
from Henderson hit the light cruiser repeatedly and sent her to the
bottom.
Kondo's force was about 480 kilometers (300 miles) northeast of the
island. Halsey was determined to deal with the Japanese, and his own
task force was sitting off the Santa Cruz Islands, about 640 kilometers
(400 miles) east of Guadalcanal. The task force included the carriers
HORNET and ENTERPRISE, which had just returned to the war zone after
lightning repairs in Pearl Harbor, plus nine cruisers and 24 destroyers,
and was under the command of the aggressive Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid.
American patrol planes found Kondo's fleet, organized in two groups,
on the afternoon of 25 October. The patrol planes were spotted by the
Japanese, however, and Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, in charge of the
carrier group, decided to make a hasty exit.
Yamamoto angrily overruled Nagumo and ordered him to attack. While Nagumo
feared another disaster like the one at Midway, particularly because
he had no idea where the American fleet was, orders were orders. The
Japanese fleet went south to engage the US Navy.
The Japanese had a larger force. The carrier group included three carriers,
a heavy cruiser, and eight destroyers. The surface force leading them
included two battleships, four cruisers, and seven destroyers. While
they didn't realize it, the US Navy force was steaming almost directly
towards them.
Back on the island, Murayama's men made another desperate attack after
the Sun went down. They were driven back once again with heavy losses,
and the attack fizzled out around midnight. Murayama had lost a total
of 3,000 men in his attacks, and had failed completely.
The Japanese fleet was located by a B-17 at about 1430 on 26 October.
The Japanese discovered the American force not much later.
Kincaid already had his orders, radioed out by Halsey that morning:
ATTACK REPEAT ATTACK
Both forces launched aircraft that evening, and the air strike forces
actually passed within sight of each other. Although Kincaid's force
detected the Japanese aircraft on radar, he delayed in ordering Wildcats
into the sky to meet them, and the American fighters were not able to
climb high enough in the time they had to stop the enemy. The Japanese
Aichi "Val" dive screamed down on the HORNET and blasted it,
the squadron commander deliberately crashing into the carrier's deck.
In the meantime, Navy Dauntlesses were making their own strikes on the
Japanese, badly damaging the cruiser CHIKUMA and hitting the carriers
SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU.
Another group of Japanese aircraft found the ENTERPRISE and her screen,
steaming about 16 kilometers (10 miles) away from the HORNET and her
escorts. Kincaid had again delayed in launching fighters, but the anti-aircraft
fire of the American vessels was intense and effective, particularly
with the new 40 millimeter Bofors guns then being fitted to warships,
along with the proven 20 millimeter Oerlikon guns.
Two bombs hit the ENTERPRISE and a near-miss damaged a turbine bearing,
but the carrier was not put out of action. By this time, American fighters
were in the air to beat back further attacks, but the Japanese still
managed to hit the battleship SOUTH DAKOTA and the cruiser SAN JUAN.
The HORNET was under tow when yet another Japanese strike wave hit the
HORNET. Saving the carrier was hopeless, and it went down early the
next morning.
The Japanese had got the better of the US Navy, sinking a carrier (plus
a destroyer), damaging another carrier, a cruiser, and a destroyer.
The Americans damaged three Japanese vessels. The Japanese had, however,
been thwarted in helping Murayama take Henderson field, and they had
lost about 100 aircraft and crews, in comparison to 74 lost by the Americans.
The Japanese could not afford to lose so many trained airmen.
Confused reports filtered up to Imperial Navy headquarters and the high
command thought the American fleet had been wiped out. Nonetheless,
despite this exhuberance, the failure of the Murayama attack convinced
Admiral Yamamoto that the battle for Guadalcanal was lost. The Americans
were stronger than the Japanese on the island, and could receive supplies
and reinforcements at a faster rate.
13 to 16 November 1942 - The naval battle of Guadalcanal
By the first days of November, the survivors of Murayama's disastrous
attempt to break the Americans had filtered back to the coast. Colonel
Tsuji sent a message to Army high command in Tokyo, taking responsibility
for the defeat. He had underestimated the enemy, he said, and had insisted
on his own battle plan, which was "erroneous".
Tsuji said he deserved "ten thousand deaths", and asked to
remain on Guadalcanal. Instead, on 3 November he was ordered back to
Tokyo to report on the situation. The next day, General Kawaguchi left
the island in disgrace. He would never forgive Tsuji for betraying him.
Reinforcements, advanced units of the Imperial Army's 38th Division,
were filtering in. Despite increasing doubts about the feasibility of
holding Guadalcanal on the part of the Imperial Navy, the Army still
wanted to fight.
The 38th Division's commander, Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sato, arrived
at Tassafaronga Point on 9 November with more of his men. They had been
shipped down by five destroyers in the night, but the bulk of the division
and its supplies were still at Shortland Island.
The Japanese intended to bring the remainder down in 11 transports and
cargo vessels, escorted by 12 destroyers. They were to be proceeded
by a raiding force, under the command of Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe, consisting
of two battleships, a light cruiser, and 14 destroyers, that would lay
down suppressive fire on Henderson Field to ensure that the transports
arrived safely.
The raiding force moved out of Rabaul on the morning of 12 November
and by that afternoon was approaching Guadalcanal. There was an Allied
surface force in the area, Task Group 67.4, under the command of Rear
Admiral Daniel J. Callahan, who had taken over command from Norman Scott.
Task Group 67.4 consisted of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,
and eight destroyers. Callahan led the group from the heavy cruiser
SAN FRANCISCO. Admiral Scott served under Callahan in command of the
heavy cruiser ATLANTA.
The Navy warships were escorting a supply convoy in the area, The supply
convoy managed to unload by dusk and took off for the open sea, while
Callahan's group looked for the Japanese raiders.
Abe knew he outgunned the Americans and did not think they would try
to take him on, and so he steamed on, unaware that he was heading for
a confrontation. Bad weather complicated matters, hiding both forces
from the other and confusing their movements.
The cruiser HELENA sighted the enemy at 0124 hours on Friday, the 13th
of November. At 0149 the shooting started. The result was a mad, furious,
confused, agonizing battle at close range in which the two sides blasted
away at each other and sometimes at their own vessels.
The fight lasted for a half hour. The US Navy got the worst of it, with
the cruiser ATLANTA hit by torpedoes and by "friendly" shells.
One hit the bridge, killing Admiral Scott and most of the bridge crew.
ATLANTA would sink presently, along with two destroyers. Only one of
the American vessels hadn't been hit. SAN FRANCISCO also took a hit
in the bridge, killing Admiral Callahan and everyone else there.
The US Navy had not taken a beating passively. One Japanese destroyer
went down and another was crippled, and Abe's flagship HIEI took fifty
hits. The engagement became known as the Battle of Friday the 13th.
The battle put on spectacular and terrible fireworks for the observers
at Henderson Field. One private wrote:
BEGIN QUOTE:
"The star shells rose, terrible and red. Giant tracers flashed
across the night in orange arches ... the sea seemed a sheet of polished
obsidian on which the warships seemed to have been dropped and been
immobilized, centered amid concentric circles like shock waves that
form around a stone dropped in mud."
END QUOTE
That was only the beginning. Callahan had taken on a fight at long
odds and at the cost of his own life to slow down the Japanese, and
had succeeded in doing so. Henderson Field was intact, and when the
Sun came up American fliers went out looking for revenge.
They caught up with the limping HIEI quickly and pounded it with bombs
and torpedoes. The battleship went down during the day.
However, the Japanese were demonstrating their customary aggressiveness
as well. When the five surviving warships of Task Group 67.4 left for
the New Hebrides to tend to their wounds late that morning, a Japanese
submarine, the I-26, tried to torpedo the SAN FRANCISCO. The torpedoes
missed that vessel, but one hit the light cruiser JUNEAU and set off
a great explosion that simply disintegrated it.
Captain Gilbert Hoover on the HELENA, in charge of the force, decided
it was too risky to pick up survivors and left them. Almost the entire
crew of the JUNEAU, some 700 men, died, including the five Sullivan
brothers. After this, the US Navy never assigned more than one family
member to a single ship.
The Japanese were still determined to get the troop convoy to Guadalcanal.
That evening, the 14th, they returned to Guadalcanal with cruisers and
destroyers and hit Henderson Field for 37 minutes. The pounding was
severe, but although 18 aircraft were destroyed, the Cactus Air Force
was still in business when the Sun came up.
The American fliers quickly found the troop convoy, under command of
the persistent Admiral Tanaka, who persisted towards Guadalcanal even
though air attacks continued all day. Destroyers laid down smoke screens,
but by the time the 15th of November was over, six of the transports
had gone to the bottom and one was disabled. Tanaka put survivors on
escorting destroyers and sent them back to Shortland Island.
Four transports and four destroyers continued on. Yamamoto was backing
up the effort to the maximum, ordering Admiral Kondo down the Slot to
hit Henderson Field once more that night with the battleship KIRISHIMA,
two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and escorts of destroyers.
Halsey was just as stubborn, and dispatched Task Force 64 under Rear
Admiral Willis "Ching" Lee to meet the Japanese. Task Force
64 included the battleships WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA, plus four destroyers.
The ships had been protecting Halsey's last carrier in the area, the
ENTERPRISE, but now were looking for a fight.
They swung around Cape Esperance that night and about 2252 hours made
radar contact with Kondo's lead vessel, the light cruiser SENDAI. Lee
waited until about 2320 to begin his attack. Both sides went into combat
energetically. In a short time, all four of Lee's destroyers had been
disabled and the SOUTH DAKOTA was dead in the water, taking a pounding
from the KIRISHIMA and the two heavy cruisers.
Then salvos from the WASHINGTON bracketed the KIRISHIMA. Nine 41 centimeter
(16 inch) and many smaller shells smashed into the Japanese battleship,
wrecking it. At 0025 hours, Kondo decided he'd had enough, and withdrew,
leaving behind the stricken KIRISHIMA and a disabled destroyer. The
captain of the KIRISHIMA had his men abandon ship onto a helpful destroyer
and then scuttled his vessel.
Admiral Tanaka had dispatched three of his destroyers to help Kondo.
By the time the battle was over, he didn't have enough time to unload
the transports by landing craft before the Sun came up, so he asked
permission to simply run them aground. Rabaul refused, but Kondo gave
permission, and Tanaka ran the transports into the shore near Tassafaronga
Point.
By this time it was getting light and the Cactus Air Force spotted the
beached transports immediately. They hit them all through the day, and
the result was a ghastly slaughter of Japanese troops.
In the end, only 4,000 troops and a small load of supplies arrived on
Guadalcanal, at the cost of 11 transports, two battleships, a heavy
cruiser, and three destroyers. The US Navy lost two light cruisers and
seven destroyers, while seven other ships were damaged. but they had
won the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, as the three-day fight would be
know.
Vandegrift send a message to Halsey with grand praise for the Navy:
BEGIN QUOTE:
"WE BELIEVE THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED A CRUSHING DEFEAT -- WE THANK
LEE FOR HIS STURDY EFFORT OF LAST NIGHT -- WE THANK KINCAID FOR HIS
INTERVENTION YESTERDAY -- OUR OWN AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN GRAND IN ITS RELENTLESS
POUNDING OF THE FOE -- THOSE EFFORTS WE APPRECIATE BUT OUR GREATEST
HOMAGE GOES TO SCOTT, CALLAGHAN AND THEIR MEN WHO WITH MAGNIFICENT COURAGE
AGAINST SEEMINGLY HOPELESS ODDS DROVE BACK THE FIRST HOSTILE STROKE
AND MADE SUCCESS POSSIBLE -- TO THEM THE MEN OF CACTUS LIFT THEIR BATTERED
HELMETS IN ADMIRATION."
END QUOTE
To the Allies the tide of the war was finally shifting definitely in
their favor. Rommel was on the run in North Africa, the Germans were
being chewed up at Stalingrad. Everywhere the Axis tide seemed to be
on the ebb.
Late November 1942 to February 1943 - The Endgame
Back in Tokyo, the Imperial Army high command still wanted to carry
on the fight, encouraged by the request of the Emperor himself to save
the Japanese warriors on Guadalcanal. In the face of the Emperor's request,
the Imperial Navy could not protest, but they had no further heart for
an operation they regarded as a lost cause.
The Army high command was somewhat unsettled in their determination
by reports from General Hyakutake on Guadalcanal that his men were dying
of starvation and disease at a rate of about a hundred a day.
The Navy was still trying to get some supplies to the starving men,
but ever increasing American sea and air power made the supply line
continuously more tenuous. The Navy was coming up with some new schemes
to help, such as a plan to load supplies in strings of oil drums hung
on fast destroyers. The drums would be cut loose off of Guadalcanal,
and motorboats or swimmers would pick them up.
The scheme was tested by the resolute Admiral Tanaka, who took nine
destroyers down the Slot to drop off supplies in this way on the evening
of 29 November. While the destroyers were dropping their cargo just
before 2300 hours, one of the warships reported sighting a column of
American warships bearing down on them.
There were five US Navy cruisers, escorted by six destroyers. The commander
of the force, Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright on board the cruiser MINNEAPOLIS,
knew Tanaka's destroyers were there but hesitated to attack. He finally
gave the order at about 2320. The Americans launched torpedoes and started
firing. They pounded the destroyer TAKANAMI, mortally wounding it.
The American sailors on board the MINNEAPOLIS were cheering when the
cruiser was hit by two torpedoes. Another torpedo hit the NEW ORLEANS,
setting off forward magazines and blowing off its bow, while yet another
torpedo hit the PENSACOLA and flooded its engine room. While the ships
milled around in confusion, the cruiser NORTHAMPTON was hit by two torpedoes,
which set off shattering secondary explosions.
The NORTHAMPTON quickly sank, while Tanaka's destroyers sped off in
the dark. Tanaka had proven once again to the Americans that the Japanese
should not be underestimated, losing one destroyer while sinking an
American cruiser and chewing up three others, even though the Japanese
force was far weaker than its opponent. The Battle of Tassafaronga was
a clear victory for the Japanese.
Tanaka tried to run supplies in oil drums twice more over the next few
evenings, but the scheme was ineffectual and the danger ever more severe.
The Navy high command was certain that Guadalcanal should be evacuated,
and slowly the Army high command was coming around to the same point
of view.
The squabbling nonetheless went on through most of December. On 23 December,
General Hyakutake sent a message to the high command from Guadalcanal:
BEGIN QUOTE:
NO FOOD AVAILABLE AND WE CAN NO LONGER SEND OUT SCOUTS. WE CAN DO NOTHING
TO WITHSTAND THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE. 17TH ARMY NOW REQUESTS PERMISSION
TO BREAK INTO THE ENEMY'S POSITIONS AND DIE AN HONORABLE DEATH RATHER
THAN DIE OF HUNGER IN OUR OWN DUGOUTS.
END QUOTE
On Christmas Day, the high command met to discuss the situation. Nobody
seriously believed that Guadalcanal could be held, the only problem
was determining how best to deal with the humiliation and embarrassment
to the Emperor it involved. The meeting was angry and fractious, but
despite protests over the delay involved, the Navy conducted strategy-game
exercises to confirm what everyone really knew by this time: there was
no way to supply an offensive on Guadalcanal.
The bickering went on for several days, until on 29 December a report
arrived from Rabaul indicating that almost everyone in the area believed
that Guadalcanal must be evacuated. On 31 December, Army Chief of Staff
General Hajime Sugiyama and Navy Chief of Staff Nagano informed the
Emperor of the decision. The Emperor was most displeased and probed
them for two hours, but in the end he agreed to the withdrawal.
By this time, the command of ground forces on Guadalcanal had changed.
On 9 December, General Vandegrift and the 1st Marine Division had shipped
out to Australia for badly needed rest and refit. In their place was
the XIV Corps, under US Army General Alexander M. Patch, which included
the 2nd Marine Division and the 25th and Americal Army divisions.
Patch spent much of January 1943 probing the Japanese positions at Mount
Austen, to the south of Henderson Field. The terrain there was extraordinarily
rugged and the Japanese were heavily dug in, but soldiers of the Americal
Division managed to seize a strategic point known as the Gifu. This
deprived the Japanese of any viewpoint on Henderson Field and Lunga
Point, and they could no longer interfere with American activities on
Guadalcanal.
Patch decided to encircle Mount Austen and starve the Japanese out,
which would not be difficult since they were dying of starvation at
a rapid rate to begin with.
By mid-January, however, the Japanese were already implementing their
evacuation plan. On 23 January, they began pulling out of their positions
on Mount Austen, moving back to Cape Esperance for withdrawal. They
left behind a rearguard to act noisily and aggressively and keep the
Americans in the dark about the withdrawal.
The Marines tended to regard most Army units as lacking aggressiveness,
and Patch's performance did nothing to change that impression. Although
he had 50,000 men against a far smaller and almost entirely sickly Japanese
force, the rearguard kept the Americans completely fooled. The Japanese
managed to withdraw almost entirely undisturbed.
On the evening of 1 February 1943, the first evacuation column of 19
Japanese destroyers arrived off Cape Esperance. They had been attacked
by American aircraft, but their fighter cover had driven the Americans
off. US Navy PT boats tried to interfere, but the Japanese sank three
of them and drove the rest off. That night, the Tokyo Express managed
to evacuate over 5,400 starving Japanese soldiers.
A second column of destroyers showed up on the evening of 4 February,
and managed to pull out almost 5,000 men. Only one destroyer was damaged.
Much to the surprise of the Japanese, the third and final column of
destroyers managed to pull out the remainder of the survivors, again
with only one destroyer damaged. The Guadalcanal campaign was over.
The 13,000 who were evacuated were all that were left of 38,000 men
the Japanese had funneled into Guadalcanal, which became known as the
"Island of Death" to them. In comparison, the Americans had
lost only about 1,600 men in the ground battles.
The Japanese had been obsessed with the "decisive battle"
with the Americans that would decide the fate of the war in the Pacific.
To an extent, this was the wishful thinking of the Japanese military,
who wanted to risk all in a glorious to-the-knife battle. Guadalcanal
was nothing glorious, merely filthy, bloody, and diseased, but it was
decisive all the same. From then on, the Japanese would be on the defensive
and the ultimate result of the war was not in doubt.
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